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AN ATTORNEY'S LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
INTRODUCTION
As a result of a dramatic growth in the number of legal malpractice
suits,' there increasingly has arisen the question of whether an attorney
should be liable for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.2 Most
decisions have limited recovery to cases in which the client suffered a
physical injury or the attorney acted egregiously.3 Such requirements
ensure the claim's genuineness, conserve judicial resources, and protect
the attorney from unfair liability.4
Some recent decisions, however, have permitted plaintiffs to recover
for emotional distress without regard to the degree of the attorney's neg-
ligence.5 These opinions examine the client interest that the attorney
represented.6 This approach distinguishes the majority rule by differenti-
ating between the client's personal and pecuniary interests.7 This view
suggests that personal interests are entitled to greater protection.8 Where
a personal interest is injured, emotional harm is more likely and the risk
of fraudulent claims limited.9 When the attorney's negligence harms a
1. Since the 1960's, there has been a large increase in the number of legal malprac-
tice cases. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice 17 (3d ed. 1989). For a collec-
tion of statistics showing the extent of the increase, see id. at 17-29.
2. See, eg., Schlumm v. Terrence J. O'Hagan, P.C., 173 Mich. App. 345, 359, 433
N.W.2d 839, 846 (1988), appeal denied, 433 Mich. 855 (1989); Gillespie V. Klun, 406
N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665-66
(Tex. 1989).
3. See, eg., Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp. 948, 954-55 (E.D. Va. 1989); Dorsey
v. Purvis, 543 So. 2d 703, 704 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989); Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein,
Frazer & Murphy, 167 Ga. App. 411, 415, 306 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga.
149, 311 S.E.2d 818 (1984); Segall v. Berkson, 139 Ill. App. 3d 325, 330-31, 487 N.E.2d
752, 756 (1985); Kunau v. Pillers, Pillers & Pillers, P.C., 404 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1987); Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 877, 686 P.2d 112, 119 (1984); 1 R.
Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 903-04.
4. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
5. See, eg., Wagenmarm v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222-23 (1st Cir. 1987); Lawson v.
Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91, 93-95 (D.N.J. 1988); Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451,
1464 (D.N.J. 1989); Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 459 (Ct. App. 1989); McEvoy
v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 788-89, 562 P.2d 540, 544 (1977).
6. See, eg., Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222; Lawson, 702 F. Supp. at 93-95; Holliday,
264 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
7. See Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222; Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 455-59.
A personal interest is a non-pecuniary interest. Compare Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222
(injury to liberty interest supported claim for emotional distress) with Holliday, 264 Cal.
Rptr. at 456 (injury to property interest insufficient to support claim for emotional dis-
tress). Examples of personal interests include liberty, see Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222,
and the right to child custody, see Hilt v. Bernstein, 75 Or. App. 502, 515, 707 P.2d 88,
96 (1985).
8. See, eg., Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 456-59 (emotional distress damages awarded
because attorney's negligence injured a fundamental personal right); Hilt, 75 Or. App. at
515, 707 P.2d at 95 (emotional distress recovery denied because the negligence injured a
pecuniary interest that did not suffice as a basis for emotional distress award).
9. See infra note 98-107 and accompanying text.
1309
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
personal interest, therefore, the courts that adopt this approach permit
the client to recover for emotional distress. 0
This Note supports the distinction between pecuniary and personal in-
juries. It argues that, where breach of duty and causation can be estab-
lished, a negligent injury to a personal interest justifies the imposition of
liability. Part I discusses the background of emotional distress recovery.
Part II reviews the standards for liability in legal malpractice. Part III
introduces the various methods used to appraise emotional distress
claims in legal malpractice actions. Part IV advocates the finding of lia-
bility where an attorney negligently harms a client's personal interest.
This Note concludes that a client should recover damages for emotional
distress where the attorney's negligence harms a personal interest.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF EMOTIONAL DIsTRESs
A. History
Courts traditionally have rejected plaintiffs' claims where emotional
distress was the sole ground of recovery.1 Awards were denied because
mental anguish was considered to be too intangible to compensate.1 2 Re-
covery, however, was not entirely foreclosed. Although mental injuries
could not independently support an action, damages could be recovered
if the emotional distress was parasitic to a physical injury. 3
The requirement that emotional distress be parasitic to a physical in-
jury originated in two nearly simultaneous decisions. 4 First, the Privy
Counsel ruled that a plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress in
the absence of an actual physical impact to his person.15 Days later, the
New York Supreme Court announced the same rule.16 The impact re-
quirement initially found wide support in America and was vigorously
10. See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222-23 (lst Cir. 1987); Holliday v.
Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 457-59 (Ct. App. 1989).
11. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 360
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser].
12. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 109-10, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55
(1896) (fright cannot form basis of action); Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. 577, 598 (1861)
("[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress"); see
also Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev.
1033, 1033-36 (1936) (common law reluctant to recognize an interest in one's peace of
mind).
13. See, e.g., Barney v. Magenis, 241 Mass. 268, 273, 135 N.E. 142, 144 (1922)
(mental anguish recoverable where it accompanies physical injury); Lynch, 9 H.L. at 598
(same); see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 363 (emotional distress parasitic to physical
injury recoverable at common law).
14. See Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 260, 260 (1921).
15. See Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222, 225-26 (1888). However,
this impact requirement was rejected in Ireland and Scotland. See, e.g., Bell v. Great
Northern Ry., 26 L.R. Ir. 428 (1890) (Ireland); Gilligan v. Robb, [1910] Sess. Cas. 856
(Scotland) (1910). The Coultas decision never found favor in Great Britain, and was
eventually overruled by Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
16. See Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R., 54 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 355, 355-56 (App. Div.
1888).
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applied.17 As the law developed, however, courts applied the impact re-
quirement with less vigor.18 The meaning of physical impact was ex-
panded to include the slightest touching.19 In addition, injuries suffered
as a consequence of the mental harm were held to satisfy the impact
requirement.20
B. Required Showing for Emotional Distress Recovery
The states use three different tests to evaluate claims for emotional
distress damages. 21 A small minority of states continue to require actual
physical impact.22 The majority limits recovery by requiring plaintiffs to
prove at least a physical consequence of the distress.23 Other states view
emotional distress as an independent harm.24
1. The Impact Rule
Decisions applying the impact rule require proof of an actual physical
impact upon the plaintiff.25 The most convincing rationale supporting
17. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 108-09, 45 N.E. 354, 354
(1896) (plaintiff could not recover distress damages even though she suffered a miscar-
riage when nearly struck by defendant's horses); Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Co., 224 Pa. 13, 15-17, 73 A. 4, 5-6 (1909) (plaintiff, who was temporarily blinded by a
flash, could not recover because she was not struck by any material substance); see also
Prosser, supra note 11, at 363 (initially a large number of American decisions denied
recovery absent actual physical impact).
18. See Throckmorton, supra note 14, at 264-65; Magruder, supra note 12, at 1036-
42.
19. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky. 1980) (being subjected to a
series of diagnostic X-Rays held sufficient impact to support an emotional distress claim);
Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351, 353 (1961) (any degree of physical impact, however
slight, could support an action for emotional distress); see also Prosser, supra note 11, at
363-64 (courts would find impact on the slightest contact).
20. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 556, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (1982)
(plaintiff must prove physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology); Melton v.
Allen, 282 Or. 731, 736, 580 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1978) (emotional distress recovery requires
physical injury or physical consequences); see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 364 (emo-
tional distress authenticated by some objective physical manifestation).
21. See Note, The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Critical Analysis of
VariousApproaches to the Tort in Light of Ochoa v. Superior Court, 19 Ind. L. Rev. 809,
809 (1986); Note, Cambell v. Animal Quarantine Station: Negligent Infliction of Mental
Distress, 4 U. Haw. L. Rev. 207, 208-13 (1982).
22. See, e.g., Wishard Memorial Hosp. v. Logwood, 512 N.E.2d 1126, 1127 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987); Wilhoite v. Cobb, 761 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
23. See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 519-20, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1978)
(requires physical manifestation); Payton, 386 Mass. at 556, 437 N.E.2d at 181 (emotional
distress caused by or causing physical harm is recoverable); see also id. at 546 n.5, 437
N.E.2d at 175 (listing of states that require proof of physical consequences); Prosser,
supra note 11, at 364 & n.55 (same).
24. See, eg., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929-30, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831, 839, 616 P.2d 813, 821 (1980); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520, 52 Hawaii 156,
174 (1970). These states use traditional tort principles to limit distress awards. See Pros-
ser, supra note 11, at 364-65.
25. See Wishard Memorial Hosp., 512 N.E.2d at 1127-28; see also supra notes 14-17
and accompanying text.
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this doctrine is that it provides certainty of liability.26 The rule has fallen
into disfavor and is followed by only two states.27
2. The Physical Consequences Rule
a. Direct Victims of the Negligence
Absent physical impact, most states require a showing of some physi-
cal manifestation of the distress resulting from the defendant's breach of
duty.2" The rationale supporting this requirement is two-fold. First, the
courts believe that mental injury can be counterfeited too easily.2 9 A
physical injury requirement would screen out fraudulent claims.30 Sec-
ond, without external indicia of harm, courts would be faced with a
plethora of questionable claims.31 Hence, the task of adjudicating these
claims would unduly strain judicial resources.32
Where the circumstances giving rise to the claim sufficiently negate
these concerns, however, the decisions have reflected a greater willing-
ness to accept the distress itself as an actionable harm.33 In Hagerty v. L
26. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 363-64.
27. See Wishard Memorial Hosp. v. Logwood, 512 N.E.2d 1126, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987); Wilhoite v. Cobb, 761 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
Texas was the first state to reject the physical impact requirement. See Hill v. Kimball,
13 S.W. 59, 59 (Tex. 1890). For a discussion of the arguments supporting the rule and
why they are no longer applicable, see Throckmorton, supra note 14, at 265-81.
28. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 364; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 313(1),
436(1) (1965).
The physical consequence need not be contemporaneous with the negligent act. For
example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed emotional distress recovery where
the manifestation appeared fourteen months after the negligent act. See Crinkley v. Holi-
day Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 159, 163-64 (4th Cir. 1988).
In these states emotional distress alone generally will not support a claim. See, eg.,
DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 609, 744 P.2d 705, 709-10 (Ct. App. 1987);
Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 875-76, 686 P.2d 112, 117-18 (1984); Falzone v.
Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 569, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (1965); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 436A comment a (1965) (negligent actor not liable for emotional distress without bod-
ily harm).
29. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 381, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638, 641 (1975).
30. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 925-26, 616 P.2d 813, 818,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 836 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b
(1965).
31. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
32. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34,
36 (1961); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965).
33. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir.
1986) (exposure to carcinogenic chemicals); Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928-31, 616 P.2d at
820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39 (healthy patient diagnosed as having syphilis); Johnson
v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 642-43 (1975)
(hospital erroneously informed daughter that her mother was dead); Martell v. St.
Charles Hosp., 137 Misc. 2d 980, 981, 523 N.Y.S.2d 342, 343 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (healthy
patient diagnosed as having cancer). But see DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604,
608-10, 744 P.2d 705, 709-11 (Ct. App. 1987) (no emotional distress recovery where
plaintiff was exposed to asbestos and suffered "cancer-phobia").
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& L Marine Services, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ruled that recovery for emotional distress is permissible without a show-
ing of physical injury.35 Hagerty viewed the physical consequence re-
quirement as unrealistic36 and doubted its adequacy in determining the
existence or extent of mental harm.37 Rather than requiring physical in-
jury, the decision focused on the circumstances surrounding the claim.38
It reasoned that where these circumstances authenticate the claim's gen-
uineness and demonstrate the causal link between the negligence and the
injury, the plaintiff should recover emotional distress damages regardless
of physical injury.39
The Fifth Circuit did not disregard the possibility that some claims
might be fraudulent. It simply considered the physical injury require-
ment an unnecessary safeguard in the facts before it," reasoning that
"[t]he circumstances surrounding the fear-inducing occurrence may
themselves supply sufficient indicia of genuineness."4"
The Fifth Circuit is not alone in its willingness to look beyond physical
injury. The New York Court of Appeals has also carved out an excep-
tion to the physical injury requirement.4 2 In the absence of physical in-
jury, New York will allow a plaintiff to recover damages where "the
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress arising from the circum-
stances of the case warrant[s]. 43 The mere fact that the amount of dam-
34. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
35. See id. at 317. Hagerty was a merchant seaman aboard a chemical-carrying
barge. In an accident caused by a defective valve, he was drenched by a mixture of
carcinogenic chemicals. Although the exposure did not cause any appreciable physical
injury, it did subject Hagerty to an increased risk of contracting cancer, a risk substantial
enough to require periodic medical testing. Hagerty filed suit claiming that the exposure,
together with the fear of contracting cancer, had caused him severe emotional distress.
On a motion for summary judgement, the trial court found for the defendant. See Hag-
erty, 788 F.2d at 316. The Fifth Circuit reversed. See id. at 317.
Though the Fifth Circuit considered the drenching a physical injury, see id. at 318 n.1,
it did not apply the physical injury rule and reached its decision on other grounds. See Id.
at 318.
36. See id. In the court's opinion "[iut is doubtful that the trier of fact is any less able
to decide the fact or extent of mental suffering in the event of physical injury .... ." Id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. Instead the question should be whether the "fear is reasonable and caus-
ally related to the defendant's negligence." See id.
40. See id. Hagerty submitted evidence to show his prior knowledge of the chemicals'
carcinogenic properties, his realization that his entire body had absorbed the chemicals
and a doctor's advice that he undergo periodic cancer testing. From this, the court con-
cluded that Hagerty had submitted "sufficient indicia of genuineness" to defeat summary
judgement. See id. at 319.
41. Id. at 318.
42. See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 20-21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d
996, 999 (1958).
43. Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 505, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1334, 462
N.Y.S.2d 421, 423 (1983).
1990] 1313
FORDHAM LAW REIEW
ages are speculative is insufficient to bar a claim.' Instead, the court and
the jury must weed out fraudulent claims.'
b. Zone of Danger Rule
The physical consequences approach has been extended to include
plaintiffs, usually bystanders, who suffer emotional distress caused by
witnessing the physical injury of another.46 In these cases, courts gener-
ally apply the zone of danger rule.4 7 This rule requires that the plaintiff
be in an area where he could have suffered physical injury, witness the
serious injury or death of a family member, and suffer serious physical
consequences from this distress.48 Some states have liberalized the rule's
requirements by increasing the geographic area,49 expanding the defini-
tion of family member,50 or rejecting the requirement that a physical
manifestation be shown.51
44. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34, 38 (1961).
45. See id. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
In a recent decision, a New York trial court applied these principles to a medical mal-
practice case. See Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 137 Misc. 2d 980, 982, 523 N.Y.S.2d 342,
344 (Sup. Ct. 1987). A patient sued her physician for negligent infliction of emotional
distress resulting from an erroneous cancer diagnosis. Although there were no allega-
tions that the patient suffered physical injury, the judge denied the physician's petition for
summary judgement. The court used the "foreseeability of the asserted wrongful act
resulting in emotional injury" as its standard for determining that mental injury was the
natural result of the doctor's negligence. See id. at 984, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 345. Where the
natural result of the negligence is emotional harm, therefore, proof of physical injury is
unnecessary. See id. at 984-85, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
46. The first recorded case of a bystander recovering for emotional distress is Ham-
brook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (1924). See also Prosser, supra note 11, at 365
(discussing Hambrook); Magruder, supra note 12, at 1038-40 (American courts have fol-
lowed Hambrook in formulating "zone of danger" rule). In Hambrook, a mother suffered
a miscarriage when she realized that her child was in the path of a runaway truck. The
court found that the mother's physical safety was threatened by the defendant's negligent
act because she too could have been injured by the truck. It considered this threat a
breach of duty regardless of the absence of physical injury. See Hambrook, [1925] 1 K.B.
at 157. With the negligence established, the resultant mental distress was merely an un-
expected manifestation of a foreseeable harm. See Hambrook, [1925] 1 K.B. at 157-58.
47. Many states have adopted some form of the "zone of danger" rule. See, e.g.,
Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 115-16, 593 P.2d 668, 669-70 (1979); Stadler v. Cross,
295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1980); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., Inc.,
139 Vt. 138, 143, 425 A.2d 92, 95 (1980). For a complete list of states that have adopted
the "zone of danger" rule, see 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970).
48. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436(3) comment f(1965); Prosser, supra note
11, at 365; Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Making "The Punishment Fit The Crime", 1 U. Haw. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1979).
49. The geographic zone is expanded so that a plaintiff need not be in actual danger of
physical injury. See General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982).
50. The definition of family member has been expanded to include more than immedi-
ate family members. See Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1985).
51. In at least one state, physical manifestations are not required. See Culbert v.
Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me. 1982).
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3. General Negligence Cause of Action
The Hawaii Supreme Court became the first52 to recognize a cause of
action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress regardless of
whether the plaintiff suffered any physical manifestation. 3 It established
"a duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious mental dis-
tress."5 4 This duty is breached when the defendant's actions would cause
"a reasonable man, normally constituted, [to] be unable to adequately
cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the
case."
55
II. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. Conflicting Theories: Tort or Contract
An attorney's liability for negligence is based on the attorney-client
relationship. 6 Because this relationship is created by agreement, a legal
malpractice claim can also be pursued on a contract theory. 57 Pursuant
to the agreement, the attorney promises to perform certain duties.5" A
52. In 1968 the California Supreme Court decided Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (Cal. 1968) and expanded the boundaries of the "zone of
danger" rule. A mother, while outside the zone of danger, witnessed the accidental death
of her child. Nonetheless, she was allowed to recover damages for emotional distress.
The court ruled that an actor owes a duty of care to any third person who might
foreseeably suffer mental anguish as a result of the actor's negligence. See id. at 740-41,
441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. The Dillon Court established three factors to
consider in determining whether a bystander is a foreseeable plaintiff: (1) bystander is
near the scene of the accident, (2) bystander personally observes the accident, and (3)
bystander is closely related to the victim. See id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr.
at 80. This decision served as a transition from the "zone of danger" rule to a general
cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
53. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 174, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); Prosser, supra
note 11, at 364-65.
54. Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
55. Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
56. See Bowman v. John Doe Two, 104 Wash. 2d 181, 185, 704 P.2d 140, 142 (1985);
D. Meiselman, Attorney Malpractice: Law and Procedure 1 (1980); Wade, The Attor-
ney's Liability for Negligence, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 755, 756 (1959).
57. See Wade, supra note 56, at 756.
An emerging trend, however, seems to require that legal malpractice claims be brought
in tort. See, e.g., Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809, 814, (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Saveca v.
Reilly, 111 A.D.2d 493, 494-95, 488 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (1985); Schroeder v. Hudgins,
142 Ariz. 395, 399, 690 P.2d 114, 118 (Ct. App. 1984). In a 1983 decision, the Louisiana
Court of Appeals stated:
[a]lthough the attorney-client relationship gives rise to an implied warranty of
the attorney to use his best professional skill and judgement, this duty is legal
rather than contractual in nature, and a breach of this duty amounts to a tort.
Only when an attorney breaches an express warranty of result does an action
for breach of contract arise.
Cherokee Restaurant, Inc. v. Pierson, 428 So. 2d 995, 998 (La. Ct. App.) (citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 431 So.2d 773 (La. 1983). But see P.V.N. Ancharya v. Carroll, 152
Wis. 2d 330, 334, 448 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Ct. App. 1989) (action for legal malpractice may
sound in tort or contract).
58. See D. Meiselman, supra note 56, at 6.
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breach of contract may result if these duties are unfulfilled. Because an
attorney rarely warrants his work,59 a breach of contract action arising
from an express provision is unusual.' ° By representing a client, how-
ever, the attorney impliedly promises to use the skill and knowledge ordi-
narily held by other attorneys.61 This implied promise duplicates the
attorney's standard of care in tort62 and is breached where the attorney
fails to represent his client with the requisite skill.63
In addition to contractual liability, an attorney is accountable for pro-
fessional negligence."4 The distinction between contract and tort theories
becomes most important when determining the availability of certain de-
fenses.65 Nonetheless, whether the action sounds in contract or tort, the
court, in determining liability, will examine the same issues and apply the
same standards.66
B. Cause of Action
The elements of legal malpractice are relatively consistent among the
jurisdictions.67 The plaintiff must establish (1) a duty arising from the
attorney-client relationship, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causal nexus be-
tween the negligence and the injury, and (4) harm.68
An attorney has a duty to represent his client with due care.69 This
duty arises when an attorney undertakes to provide specific professional
59. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 415.
60. See id. at 415 & n.1.
61. See, eg., Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926, 928 (Miss. 1982); Peters v. Sim-
mons, 87 Wash. 2d 400, 404, 552 P.2d 1053, 1055 (1976); see also Wade, supra note 56, at
756-57 & n. 11 (courts declare attorney impliedly contracts to use requisite skill and
knowledge).
62. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 417. Compare Peters, 87 Wash. 2d at
404, 552 P.2d at 1055 (failure to exercise requisite skill could constitute breach of con-
tract) with Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 396-97, 521 A.2d 1343, 1347 (App.
Div. 1987) (failure to exercise requisite skill is negligence).
63. See Peters, 87 Wash. 2d at 404, 552 P.2d at 1055.
64. See Gautam, 215 N.J. Super. at 396, 521 A.2d at 1347; Whitehead v. Cuffie, 185
Ga. App. 351, 352, 364 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1987).
65. See Wade, supra note 56, at 756.
For example, the statute of limitations will differ in contract and tort actions. See
Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 167 Ga. App. 411, 412-14, 306 S.E.2d
340, 341-42 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 149, 311 S.E.2d 818 (1984); see also 1 R. Mallen & J.
Smith, supra note 1, at 402 (except for the effects of certain defenses, tort and contract
generally reach the same result); D. Meiselman, supra note 56, at 65-69 (same).
66. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 402.
67. See, e.g., Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91, 92 (D.N.J. 1988) (listing elements of
legal malpractice claim); Whitehead, 185 Ga. App. at 352, 364 S.E.2d at 89 (same);
Schlumm v. Terrence J. O'Hagan, P.C., 173 Mich. App. 345, 359, 433 N.W.2d 839, 846(1988), appeal denied, 433 Mich. 855 (1989) (same); Gillespie v. Klun, 406 N.W.2d 547,
555 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
68. See Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451, 1462 (D.N.J. 1989); Ibn-Sadiika v.
Riester, 380 Pa. Super. 397,403, 551 A.2d 1112, 1115 (Super. Ct. 1988); 1 R. Mallen & J.
Smith, supra note 1, at 425-29.
69. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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legal services to the client.7" No clear rules establish when the relation-
ship begins; the issue is largely a question of fact.7"
Malpractice may not be inferred from a bad result.72  Instead, the
plaintiff must show that the attorney breached a duty.73 An attorney
breaches his duty by failing to meet the requisite standard of care.74 This
standard requires that the attorney exercise the skill and knowledge ordi-
70. See York v. Stiefel, 109 Ill. App. 3d 342, 347-48, 440 N.E.2d 440, 445 (1982),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 99 Ill. 2d 312, 458 N.E.2d 448 (1983); 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith,
supra note 1, at 404.
Although the relationship arises out of an agreement between the parties, an exchange
of consideration is not required. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 406-07.
The relationship can be formed by means other than express contract. See, e.g., Simmer-
son v. Blanks, 149 Ga. App. 478, 479-80, 254 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1979) (attorney liable for
malpractice where he acted gratuitously and the client relied on his promise); Passmore v.
Harrison, 19 Md. App. 143, 148, 310 A.2d 205, 207 (1973) (court-appointed attorney).
This duty, however, is not necessarily limited to the immediate client; the attorney may
be liable to third persons. See, eg., Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 771, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 191, 191-92 (1971) (attorney liable to any person who reasonably and justifiably
relied on the attorney); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987) (attorney
liable to beneficiaries of a will where his negligence defeated the testator's intent). See
generally I R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, 285-359 (discusses attorney's liability
absent privity).
The states are sharply split over whether privity between attorney and client should be
required to maintain a legal malpractice action. Compare Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,
687 (1961) (an attorney is liable to those who reasonably rely on his services), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) with Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 205-06 (1880) (priv-
ity of contract is necessary for legal malpractice claim) and Grassi v. Tatavito Homes,
Inc., 90 A.D.2d 479, 480, 454 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (1982) (absent privity, an attorney is not
liable for simple negligence), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 1038, 448 N.E.2d 1356, 462 N.Y.S.2d 445
(1983).
71. See Boisdore v. Bridgeman, 502 So.2d 1149, 1152 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Gillespie
v. Klun, 406 N.W.2d 547, 555-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
72. See Hulstrand, Anderson, Larson & Boyland v. Rogers, 386 N.W.2d 302, 304
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986); 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 854-55.
The attorney "is not, in the absence of an express agreement, an insurer of the sound-
ness of his opinions or of the validity of an instrument that he is engaged to draft; and he
is not liable for being in error as to a question of law on which reasonable doubt may be
entertained by well-informed lawyers." See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 592, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 821, 825, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
73. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
74. The attorney's standard of care is explicitly set out in the case of Hodges v.
Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954):
When an attorney engages in the practice of law and contracts to prosecute an
action in behalf of his client, he impliedly represents that (1) he possesses the
requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability necessary to the practice of his
profession and which others similarly situated ordinarily possess; (2) he will
exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him; and
(3) he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his
skill and in the application of his knowledge to his client's cause.
Id. at 520, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46.
Most jurisdictions require expert testimony to establish the standard of care. See
Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 218, (1st Cir. 1987); Gibson v. Talley, 156 Ga.
App. 593, 594, 275 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1980); Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 879, 686
P.2d 112, 120 (1984); D. Meiselman, supra note 56, at 151.
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narily possessed by attorneys under similar circumstances.75
The plaintiff must prove the causal link between the attorney's breach
of duty and the injury.76 The fundamental principles of causation in a
legal malpractice action mirror those in a general negligence action. The
plaintiff must prove that but for the attorney's negligence, the injury
would not have occurred." In addition, he must show that his injury
was the proximate result of the attorney's carelessness. 78 This proximate
cause requirement insulates the attorney from liability for unforeseeable
harm. 7
9
Where the attorney's negligence occurred in the course of a litigation
the plaintiff must show that he would have been successful in the under-
lying case.80 This is commonly referred to as a requirement to prove a
"suit within a suit."81 In addition, assuming the underlying claim is
valid, the plaintiff must prove that the initial defendant could have paid
the judgement. Otherwise, the attorney's negligence caused no harm,
and the client recovers nothing.8 2
Damage is a substantive requirement of the action and must be proved
as an independent element.83 It is well-settled that the plaintiff can re-
cover for all damage that is directly and proximately caused by the attor-
75. See Bowman, 235 Kan. at 878, 686 P.2d at 120; Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d
662, 664 (Tex. 1989); 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 856; see also Restatement
(Second) Torts § 299A (1965) (professional's standard of care).
Similar circumstances include locality and specialization. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith,
supra note 1, at 857. Knowledge of local rules, statutes and practices can be crucial to
the proper representation of a client. See id. at 873. Thus locality is often a factor in
determining the standard of care. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 299A comment g
(1965). States that do consider locality usually apply a statewide standard. See Kellos v.
Sawilowsky, 254 Ga. 3, 5-6, 325 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1985); Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24,
510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986); D. Meiselman, supra note 56, at 35-36.
Courts have recently begun to consider whether attorneys practicing in recognized spe-
cialty areas should be held to a heightened standard of care. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith,
supra note 1 at 865-67. Increasingly, these courts have suggested that "an attorney un-
dertaking a task in a specialized area of law must exercise the degree of skill and knowl-
edge possessed by those attorneys who practice in that specialty." Id. This heightened
standard applies only if the area of law is truly a specialty. Whether an attorney is acting
as a specialist is determined from the surrounding circumstances. See id. at 869. The
court should consider: (1) whether the state bar or the American Bar Association recog-
nizes the area as a specialty, and (2) the defendant attorney's own characterization of his
practice. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith note 1, at 869-70; Restatement (Second) Torts
§ 299A comments c, d, e (1965).
76. See De Piero v. Goodman, 14 Mass. App. 929, 929, 436 N.E.2d 998, 999 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029 (1983).
77. See Molever v. Roush, 152 Ariz. 367, 371, 732 P.2d 1105, 1109 (1986); 1 R.
Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 412.
78. See Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 397, 521 A.2d 1343, 1347 (App.
Div. 1987).
79. See id. at 399, 521 A.2d at 1348-49.
80. See Wade, supra note 56, at 769.
81. See id.
82. See D. Meiselman, supra note 56, at 43-44; Wade, supra note 56, at 770.
83. See Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245, 1256 (10th Cir. 1980).
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ney's negligence.8 4
III. RECOVERING FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN LEGAL
MALPRACTICE
It can be reasonably expected that the client will suffer some degree of
emotional harm when the attorney's efforts conclude with an unfavorable
result. 5 The vast majority of appellate decisions that have considered
the issue have held that an attorney is not liable for emotional distress
damages where the attorney's conduct has been merely negligent.8 6
There is an emerging trend, however, that allows a client to recover for
emotional distress.8 7
A. Majority Rule
Under the majority rule, damages for emotional distress are awarded
only when the plaintiff has suffered a physical injury or the attorney has
acted egregiously.88 Although the rule is widely applied,8 9 there is less
consensus on its supporting rationale.
The most widely accepted rationale is rooted in the law's general mis-
trust of emotional distress claims and its fear of excessive litigation.90
Absent a physical injury or egregious conduct, the claim's genuineness is
highly suspect.91 Moreover, because the "parties in all [cases] make sub-
stantial emotional investments in their causes and suffer mental anguish
in the event of an adverse result," allowing such claims would open the
floodgates of litigation.92
Another rationale is based on the dual contract/tort nature of legal
84. See Zych v. Jones, 84 Ill. App. 3d 647, 652, 406 N.E.2d 70, 75 (1980); D. Meisel-
man, supra note 56, at 55-57.
85. See Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp. 948, 955 (E.D. Va. 1989).
86. See, e-g., Timms, 713 F. Supp. at 954-56; Dorsey v. Purvis, 543 So. 2d 703, 704
(Ala. Civ. App. 1989); Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 167 Ga. App.
411, 415, 306 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1983) aff'd, 252 Ga. 149, 311 S.E.2d 818 (1984); Segall v.
Berkson, 139 Ill. App. 3d 325, 330-31, 487 N.E.2d 752, 756 (1985); Kunau v. Pillers,
Pillers & Pillers, P.C., 404 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Bowman v. Doherty,
235 Kan. 870, 877, 686 P.2d 112, 119 (1984); 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at
904.
87. See, eg., Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222-23 (1st Cir. 1987); Snyder v.
Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451, 1464 (D.N.J. 1989); Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr.
448, 459 (Ct. App. 1989).
88. See Timms, 713 F. Supp 948 at 954; Hamilton, 167 Ga. App. at 415, 306 S.E.2d
at 343; Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 399-400, 521 A.2d 1343, 1348-49, (App.
Div. 1987).
89. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
91. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965).
92. See Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp 948, 955 (E.D. Va. 1989).
In Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 167 Ga. App. 411, 306 S.E.2d
340 (1983), aff'd 252 Ga. 149, 311 S.E.2d 818 (1984), defendant law firm erroneously
advised Hamilton on the securities aspects of structuring his company's debt. As a result,
Hamilton was indicted and tried for securities fraud. Hamilton was acquitted and filed a
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malpractice.9 3 Most states deny recovery for emotional distress for
breach of contract unless the breach amounts to an independent tort or
the contract is personal in nature.9" When courts sense that an attorney's
liability flowing from tort principles is too high, they frequently apply
contract law limitations9 5 to legal malpractice.96 Thus, these decisions
apply the "independent tort" requirement to legal malpractice and it "is
transformed into the requirement of additional misconduct beyond...
ordinary professional negligence ....
B. Decisions Allowing Emotional Distress
The developing trend emphasizes the client's injured interest in deter-
mining the extent of the attorney's liability for emotional distress dam-
ages.98 Where the attorney is protecting a pecuniary interest, emotional
malpractice suit against the law firm; he claimed damage for emotional distress. See id.,
306 S.E.2d at 341.
Hamilton failed to prove physical injury or egregious conduct. The jury, however,
returned a $1,000,000 verdict; $38,206 as compensation for the attorney's fees and the
remainder as general damages, including emotional distress. The trial judge directed a
verdict for Hamilton, but only for the amount of the attorney's fees. See Hamilton, 167
Ga. App. at 411-12, 306 S.E.2d at 344.
Hamilton's appeal was denied. The appellate court regarded his emotional distress as
an injury incapable of independently supporting a negligence action. See id. at 416, 306
S.E.2d at 344. The court viewed the firm's obligation to Hamilton as among the many
moral obligations inherent in society that cannot be enforced by the courts. See id. at
416, 306 S.E.2d at 344. It feared that recognizing such a cause of action would be a
precursor to an inordinate increase in litigation that would needlessly consume judicial
resources. See id. at 416, 306 S.E.2d at 344; see also Restatement (Second) Torts § 436A
comment b (1965) (the potential for opening the floodgates of litigation weighs against
recovery for emotional distress caused by ordinary negligence). Absent a contrary policy
consideration, therefore, Hamilton's mental tranquility could not be protected by the
courts. See Hamilton, 167 Ga. App. at 416, 306 S.E.2d at 344.
93. See Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal of the Crumbling
Dike and the Threatening Flood, 61 Temp. L. Rev. 1127, 1164 (1988).
94. See Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp. 948, 954 (E.D. Va. 1989); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 353 (1965).
95. See Bauman, supra note 93, at 1158-62, 1164-65.
96. See id. at 1164; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965).
In Dorsey v. Purvis, 543 So.2d 703 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988), Purvis negligently repre-
sented Dorsey in a criminal trial. As a result, Dorsey was convicted and sentenced to a
50 year jail term. Dorsey sued his attorney for malpractice. He was awarded the entire
attorney's fee, but was denied an emotional distress award. See id. at 703-04. The Ala-
bama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. It considered the attorney's culpability too slight
to warrant liability. See id. at 704. The court stated:
[A]ppellant was awarded all damages under the contract count to which he
would have been entitled under the malpractice count. No theory would have
supported damages for mental anguish.
'There can be no recovery for emotional distress, where [the legal malprac-
tice] does not involve any affirmative wrong-doing but merely neglect of duty,
and the client may not recover for mental anguish where the contract which
was breached was not predominantly personal in nature.'
Id. (quoting 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 273).
97. See Bauman, supra note 93, at 1165.
98. Compare Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987) (emotional
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distress damages are severely limited.99 Where the interest is personal,
however, courts adopting this view are more willing to compensate emo-
tional harm. 100
In Wagenmann v. Adams,10 1 the First Circuit departed from the ma-
jority rule and allowed a client to recover emotional distress damages
from a negligent attorney.10 2 Wagenmann did not address whether dis-
tress damages are appropriate for an injured property right."0 3 However,
the decision considered the situation "completely different where.., the
lawyer's malpractice results in a loss of liberty." 1"
The First Circuit thus recognized a distinction between pecuniary and
personal interests. Wagenmann argued that where a personal interest is
injured, the resulting emotional harm is real and significant.10 5 In the
court's view, attorneys are liable for any direct damages caused by their
negligence. Under this view, therefore, they should also be responsible
for the emotional distress that results when they negligently injure a per-
sonal interest.10 6 The court dismissed the potential for fraudulent claims
reasoning that any such risks were small when a liberty interest was
injured. 107
distress damages recovered for loss of liberty) and Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448,
459 (Ct. App. 1989) (emotional distress awarded where personal interest injured) with
Hilt v. Bernstein, 75 Or. App. 502, 515, 707 P.2d 88, 95-96 (1985) (recovery for emo-
tional distress denied because injury to an economic interest is insufficient to support an
award).
99. See Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 456 (1989); Hilt, 75 Or. App. at 513-15, 707
P.2d at 95-96.
100. See, eg., Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 456 (negligence caused improper murder
conviction); McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 788-89, 562 P.2d 540, 544 (Or. 1977)
(negligence caused client to lose custody of her child).
101. 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987).
102. Wagenmann was accused of various crimes and was ordered to undergo evalua-
tion at a state psychiatric hospital. His court-appointed attorney, Healy, failed to take
any action on Wagenmann's behalf. Through the independent efforts of a court psychia-
trist, Wagenmann was released and the charges dropped. See Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at
205.
103. See id. at 222.
104. Id.
105. See id.
The California Court of Appeals recently adopted this reasoning. See Holliday v.
Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 457-58 (Ct. App. 1989). The California court strongly argued
that an injury to a personal interest directly causes emotional distress. See id. at 456-57.
In the court's view, "emotional distress damages necessarily result from the loss of...
liberty due to no other reason than lawyer malpractice." Id. at 456.
106. See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987). The court wrote:
"there is little room to doubt that the harm Wagenmann suffered due to Healy's bungling
was real and significant, and that the injury was reasonably foreseeable under the circum-
stances." Id.
107. See id. "[B]oth foreseeability and indicia of genuineness [are] important factors in
considering whether recovery for emotional distress should be allowed. We note that
both these factors have been established rather conclusively in the present case." Id. at
222 n.19 (citations omitted).
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IV. ATTORNEYS SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS DAMAGES
A. The Majority Rule Does Not Protect Important Client Interests
The majority rule is too restrictive. By ignoring the unique nature of
personal interests,108 it fails to protect the client adequately from the
emotional harm that results when a personal interest is injured.19
Although most decisions purport to redress the harm proximately caused
by negligence, 110 most erect barriers that limit emotional distress recov-
ery."' Where the attorney is negligent in representing his client's per-
sonal interests, the rationales supporting these barriers are inapplicable.
Courts need only consider the circumstances surrounding the claim to
satisfy their concerns regarding the genuineness of the distress. 12 The
circumstances "may themselves supply sufficient indicia of genuine-
ness." 113  Where a personal interest is invaded, such indicia are
extensive."14
Many opinions have argued that the emotional distress caused by the
malpractice is likely to be so insignificant that adjudicating such claims
would unduly burden judicial resources." 5 Where a personal interest is
injured, however, the emotional harm is likely to be substantial. For ex-
ample, where the attorney's negligence results in a client's loss of liberty,
the impact on the individual is great." 6 The Supreme Court has charac-
terized the personal loss resulting from involuntary commitment as hav-
ing "a very significant impact on the individual.""' 7 Another example is
the painful effect of losing custody of one's child. This is evidenced by a
recent study"' which concluded that divorced fathers who lost custody
of their children suffered from a greater degree of depression and anxiety
108. See infra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
110. See Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 397, 521 A.2d 1343, 1347 (App.
Div. 1987).
111. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
113. See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986).
114. See, eg., Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987) (loss of liberty
causes emotional distress); Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 877, 686 P.2d 112, 119
(1984) (one negligently imprisoned suffers an injury which could cause emotional dis-
tress); Hilt v. Bernstein, 75 Or. App. 502, 515, 707 P.2d 88, 95-96 (1985) (losing custody
of a child provides an independent basis for emotional distress liability); S. Rep. No. 225,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 248, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3430
(a person wrongly committed "'will be exposed to physical, emotional and general
mental agony.' ") (quoting Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1078 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969)).
115. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text; see also Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 436A comment b (1965).
116. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
117. See id. at 426.
118. See Stewart, Schwebel & Fine, The Impact of Custodial Arrangement on the Ad-
justment of Recently Divorced Fathers, 9 J. Divorce 55, 56-57 (1986).
1322 [Vol. 58
ATTORNEY LIABILITY
when compared to divorced fathers who retained custody. 119 In these
cases, the burden on the court's judicial resources pales when compared
to the seriousness of the loss.120
Courts also consider the attorney's culpability when evaluating his lia-
bility for emotional distress. 121 When attorneys negligently harm a cli-
ent's personal interests, it is not unreasonable to hold them liable for
emotional distress because where a case implicates a personal interest,
the attorney can readily foresee that emotional harm could result from
his negligence. 122 It would be unfair, therefore, to shield the attorneys
from their own negligence at the client's expense.123
B. The Underlying Principles of Tort Law Favor Extending
Malpractice Liability
Allowing distress damages where the client's personal interests are
harmed would comport with the fundamental principles of tort law.
When deciding whether to extend liability, courts must balance compet-
ing interests,124 considering several factors: (1) the need for compensa-
tion, (2) precedent, (3) the defendant's culpability, (4) convenience of
administration, (5) the parties' capacity to bear the loss, and (6)
deterrence. 25
First, the victimized client should be compensated. Although the
plaintiff has suffered only mental harm, it does not lessen the fact that
119. See id. at 56, 61-64.
120. The risk of increased litigation should not prevent courts from granting relief on
meritorious claims. See Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 566-67, 214 A.2d 12, 16 (1965).
Rather, judicial resources should be expanded to meet the need. See iL at 567, 214 A.2d
at 16; see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 361-62 (courts obligated to make precedent where
the wrong calls for redress).
121. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
122. Emotional distress is "virtually a guaranteed result" where the attorney's negli-
gent representation causes a loss of liberty. See Holiday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 457
(Ct. App. 1989); supra note 114.
123. See, eg., Wagenmarm v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (lst Cir. 1987) (client's emo-
tional distress foreseeable, and therefore actionable, where attorney negligently caused
client to be placed in a mental institution); Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 456 (where client's
liberty interest is involved, attorney's negligence is sufficiently culpable to allow distress
recovery); see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 361 ("[w]here the concern is to avoid impos-
ing excessive punishment upon a negligent defendant, it must be asked whether fairness
will permit leaving the burden of loss instead upon the innocent victim.").
Requiring personal injury or egregious conduct without considering the interest in-
volved can lead to illogical, and even unfair, results. See Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222.
Where the attorney's negligence causes pecuniary harm, the loss is measurable and can be
recovered. See id. Where the negligence causes a loss of liberty, however, the client is
not compensated. See id. Because there is no physical injury, the law recognizes no harm
to compensate. This result cannot be tolerated. "That [the attorney] was guilty of mal-
practice in the defense of [a personal right], rather than in the prosecution of a civil claim
for damages, is no reason artificially to shield him from the condign consequences of his
carelessness." Id.
124. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 17-18.
125. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 20-26; see also L. Green, Judge and Jury 97 (1930)
(listing five factors).
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injury has occurred.126 Harm to a personal interest virtually guarantees
that emotional distress will result. 27 Moreover, placing a monetary
value on emotional pain is not an impossible task.128 A jury can deter-
mine the existence and extent of the harm, and when appropriate, award
adequate compensation. 129 Recovery for emotional distress, therefore,
must be allowed where harm and causation are established and where the
circumstances surrounding the claim adequately guarantee its
genuineness. 
130
Second, the scarcity of precedent supporting recovery should not bar
the claim.13 1 A fundamental goal of our legal system is to redress all
substantial wrongs.13 2 A meritorious claim, therefore, should not be de-
feated solely because it is novel. 133 Rather, courts are to examine
whether there has been a wrong that can be redressed.13 4 Moreover,
there is growing support for establishing liability where a personal inter-
est is injured.1 35 This emerging trend, coupled with the judiciary's obli-
126. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 919, 616 P.2d 813, 814,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 832 (1980) ("emotional injury may be fully as severe and debilitating
as physical harm, and is no less deserving of redress"); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,433,
404 A.2d 8, 15 (1979) (court recognized "that mental and emotional distress is just as
'real' as physical pain"), overruled in part by, Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 985
(1984) (Procanik overruled that part of Berman that held that child born with birth de-
fects could not recover emotional distress damages from negligent doctor); see also Pros-
ser, supra note 11, at 360 ("Mental suffering is no more difficult to estimate in financial
terms, and no less real an injury than 'physical' pain.").
127. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
128. See Berman, 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d, at 14.
129. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 243, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34, 38 (1961).
130. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383-84, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638, 643 (1975).
131. Unlike contract and property law, where stability and predictability are crucial,
tort is an area in which the rule of stare decisis is limited. See Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J.
559, 569, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (1965).
132. See Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d at 240-41, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (1961).
133. See Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N.Y. 176, 178, 44 N.E. 773, 774 (1896); Prosser,
supra note 11, at 18.
134. See Kujek, 150 N.Y. at 179, 44 N.E. at 774.
135. See, eg., Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222-23 (1st Cir. 1987); Snyder v.
Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451, 1464 (D.N.J. 1989); Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr.
448, 459 (Ct. App. 1989).
In Gautam v. De Luca a New Jersey appellate court reversed an emotional distress
award because the clients suffered only economic harm. See Gautam v. De Luca, 215
N.J. Super. 388, 394, 521 A.2d 1343, 1349 (App. Div. 1987). The court emphasized that
the relationship between the attorney and clients had been predicated upon an economic
interest. See id. at 400, 521 A.2d at 1349. By limiting its decision to the facts before it,
the court left open the question of whether attorneys are liable for emotional distress
when they negligently injure a personal interest. See id.
Subsequently, two United States district courts considered whether Gautam barred a
client's emotional distress claim where the attorney's negligence caused a loss of liberty.
See Snyder, 708 F. Supp. at 1464; Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91, 93 (D.N.J. 1988).
In each case the attorney was retained to defend a criminal charge. Both courts held the
attorney liable, distinguishing Gautam on the ground that the attorney-client relationship
was predicated on a personal interest rather than an economic interest.
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gation to redress substantial wrongs, favors the extension of liability.
Third, although the attorney did not willfully harm the client, his care-
lessness is sufficient justification for imposing liability. Courts resist sub-
jecting a negligent attorney to liability for purely emotional harm1 36
because they consider emotional injury unforeseeable.137 Where a per-
sonal interest is harmed, however, emotional distress is not only foresee-
able, it should be expected.1 38 In essence, the attorney is on notice that
his negligence will cause emotional harm. Thus, simple negligence does
warrant imposition of liability.1 39
Fourth, allowing recovery will not unduly burden the judicial re-
sources. Because of limitations on these resources, courts adjudicate
only serious wrongs." Where a personal interest is harmed the plain-
tiff's claim is serious and valid. Many decisions have recognized that
emotional harm results when a personal interest is injured. 41 In guard-
ing against a "flood of litigation," courts must not ignore these valid
claims.142 To do so would deny the plaintiff full justice, and defeat the
very purpose of the judicial system. 43
Fifth, the attorney is in a better position to bear the loss than is his
client. When determining liability, courts weigh the parties' relative abil-
ity to absorb the loss.'" An attorney can insure against the risk of liabil-
ity by buying malpractice insurance.14 5 This cost can be passed on to
clients as an operating expense. By this means a potentially disastrous
loss to an individual plaintiff is spread among a much larger group.' 46
Finally, imposing liability on the attorney will have a deterrent ef-
fect.'47 Where the attorney is responsible for the emotional harm caused
136. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
137. See id.
138. See Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222; Snyder, 708 F. Supp. at 1464; Holliday, 264
Cal. Rptr. at 456.
139. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 22-23.
140. See id. at 23-24.
141. See supra note 114.
142. See Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 514-15, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1340,
462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 429-30 (1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 522, 448 N.E.2d at 1344, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 433 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting).
144. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 24-25.
145. See generally 2 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 715-68 (discussion of legal
malpractice insurance).
Spreading the burden by obtaining liability insurance has been judicially encouraged.
See I S. Speiser, C. Krause & A. Gans, The American Law of Torts 106 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Speiser].
The Holliday court recognized the potential effect that the expansion of liability would
have on the cost and availability of malpractice insurance. See Holliday v. Jones, 264
Cal. Rptr. 448, 459 (1989). Unfortunately, the parties failed to offer evidence on the
issue. The court concluded, that absent such evidence, any determination would be too
speculative. See id.
146. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 24.
147. Cf Prosser, supra note 11, at 25 (liability is a strong incentive to prevent harm).
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by his negligence, he has a strong incentive to act more diligently.148
Analogously, one purpose of strict products liability is to induce manu-
facturers to design and build safer products.149 Similarly, attorneys
should be induced to represent their clients' personal interests more care-
fully by exposing attorneys to liability for the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.150
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, an attorney has been insulated from liability for negli-
gently inflicting emotional distress on his client. Absent physical injury
or egregious conduct, most decisions hold that the harm caused is insuffi-
cient to support damages for emotional distress. This rule is too restric-
tive and provides little protection for important personal interests.
An emerging trend, however, allows a client to recover for emotional
distress where the attorney's negligence injures a personal interest. This
trend reflects the view that emotional distress naturally results when such
interests are harmed. Although no injury is shown, the genuineness of
the claim can be guaranteed by the surrounding circumstances. Where
limitations are to be placed on emotional distress damages, the determi-
nation should turn on the nature of the plaintiff's interests and not the
nature of the defendant's negligence.
Courts have recognized that substantial emotional harm results when
a personal interest is injured. Allowing emotional distress damages in
these situations would fully compensate those victimized by attorney
negligence.
Joseph J. Kelleher
148. See id. at 25-26.
149. See Speiser, supra note 145, at 109 & n.12.
150. Cf id. (to avoid liability, manufacturers produced safer products).
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